Terrorist Suspect Religious Identity and Public Support for Harsh Interrogation and Detention Practices

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Does the U.S. public's support for the use of harsh interrogation and detention practices against terrorism suspects depend upon the religious identity of the alleged perpetrators? Some scholarly research indicates greater public acceptance for abridging the rights of Muslims after 9/11. This is consistent with literature suggesting that heightened perception of threat decreases popular tolerance for racial, ethnic, and religious outgroups. This study executes a survey experiment and finds respondents to be more permissive of the use of extraordinary detention practices, such as indefinite detention and denying suspects access to legal counsel and civilian criminal courts, against terror suspects identified as Muslims. Furthermore, the study reveals that respondents are significantly less likely to treat domestic, right-wing terrorist suspects with extraordinary detention, suggesting ingroup leniency.

The 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States prompted a dramatic change in standards of treatment for individuals accused of terrorism and held by U.S. counterterrorism authorities. Practices once considered beyond the pale are now permitted if they are used against terrorism suspects. These practices, referred to by Bush-era counterterrorism officials as "enhanced interrogation techniques," include the use of physically and psychologically punishing interrogation practices, such as beatings, exposure of detainees to extreme temperatures and noises, use of electric shocks, and waterboarding. In addition to harsh interrogation, post-9/11 counterterrorism officials have adopted extraordinary detention practices such as holding terror suspects without charge for indefinite periods of time, denying suspects access to regular due process or legal counsel, and subjecting suspects to military courts and tribunals, instead of civilian courts, where rules of evidence are quite different. Counterterrorism officials have justified the use of these techniques on the basis of the unique challenges the threat of terrorism poses to U.S. security. These include the alleged urgent need to obtain intelligence from captured terror suspects, the need to keep suspects from transmitting information to their comrades, the difficulty in building legal cases against terrorists using the civilian criminal justice system and the assumption that terrorists post too great of a security risk for normal bail, parole, or incarceration practices (Dershowitz, 2002; Ignatieff, 2004).

As can be expected, such interrogation and detention techniques are controversial and have drawn condemnation from U.S. and foreign quarters. (Bellamy, 2006; Margulies, 2006; Wilson, 2005) But, what does the U.S. public think of such practices? Polling evidence suggests that,

generally speaking, Americans have mixed or ambivalent opinions about these practices. In the most comprehensive study published to date, Gronke et al. (2010, p. 438) examine a series of polls conducted from 2001 to 2009 on harsh interrogation practices and find that around 55% of respondents opposed the use of torture against terror suspects, whereas around 40.8% approved. Moreover, when the authors examined public support for specific interrogation tactics, such as waterboarding or exposure to extreme heat or cold, they found that most American respondents opposed all physically punishing techniques, while giving only tepid support (between 52 and 66%) to practices such as subjecting detainees to stress positions, noise, sleep deprivation, and harsh interrogation (Gronke et al., 2010, p. 441). Respondents in a study by Hertel, Scruggs, and Heidkamp (2009, p. 449) convey even greater U.S. public opposition to the use of torture: nearly 70% of respondents opposed the use of torture by American officials in any circumstance, while almost 20% supported torture in only some circumstances. However, the survey questions in this later study are much more general and abstract than those asked by Gronke et al. (2010), assessing respondents' beliefs about the universalization of "Freedom from torture" rather than specific techniques used by officials in the context of the counterterrorism efforts or national security.

Polling evidence suggests mixed and conditional support for extraordinary detention and trial techniques, however. Examining data from the 2001 National Civil Liberties Survey, Davis (2007) determined that respondents were supportive of protecting the civil liberties of the accused in certain circumstances—particularly when cast in abstract situations—but were about evenly split when polled about detention of noncitizens and foreigners. Polling by news agencies and academic institutions also reveals conditional support. For example, majorities support trying terror suspects before military commissions—which afford the accused fewer rights than civilian criminal courts—and continuing to detain, without charge or access to a lawyer, terrorism suspects and foreign detainees in Guantanamo Bay (CBS News, 2010; Montopoli, 2001; Quinnipiac, 2010). The same polls, however, also show majority support for extending Miranda rights to individuals arrested on terrorism charges, suggesting some support for preserving rights of the accused in the War on Terror.

Threat, Outgroup Hate, Ingroup Love

These survey results suggest that overall the American public is ambivalent about the use of the post-9/11 extraordinary interrogation and detention practices against individuals accused of terrorist activity. However, are Americans likely to voice stronger support for such techniques if the suspect in question is explicitly identified as Muslim or Arab? This question is relevant given the climate of heightened perception of national security threat after the 9/11 attacks and the increase in suspicion of and intolerance for persons of Middle Eastern, Arab, and/or Muslim background. After the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C., and during the protracted U.S. military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, negative stereotypes of Muslims spiked among Americans (Gibson, 2008). Oswald (2005, p. 1775) documents post-9/11 increases of anti-Muslim hostility and incidents of discrimination in the United States. These include hate crimes perpetrated against Muslims or people of Middle Eastern descent as well as workplace discrimination and denial of access to public places and airline transportation. "Radical Muslims" were rated, in opinion surveys of the American public, to be within the top three most despised and distrusted groups in the United States (Gibson, 2008).

Though negative stereotypes about Muslims and Arabs—in particular that Muslims are predisposed to violent extremism and pose a threat to security—were prevalent in American culture prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks (Johnson, 1992; Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009), there is clear evidence that the 9/11 events, by elevating public anxiety about national security, created more fertile ground for Islamophobia, and decreased tolerance for Muslim rights (Gonzales, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe,

2008; Huddy, Feldman, Capelos & Provost 2002; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005). Scholars have found that heightened negative attitudes towards Muslims affects public sentiment about treatment of Muslims by law enforcement. Public support for curtailing Muslim and Arab-American civil liberties—for example, by requiring Muslims to submit to increased monitoring by authorities or by surveillance of Muslim houses of worship—dramatically increased in the post-9/11 environment, particularly among self-described political conservatives. (Davis, 2007; Davis & Silver, 2004; Nisbet, Ostman, & Shanahan, 2008) Surveys conducted after 9/11 indicate that the American public regards Muslim-perpetrated terrorism to be a clear and present danger to American security and that the public is supportive of subjecting Muslim citizens to different civil liberties standards than non-Muslims. This includes profiling Muslim airline passengers, wiretapping Muslim mosques and monitoring them for radical activity and, in one poll by a 25% minority, resorting to mass imprisonment of Muslims should another 9/11-type terrorist attack occur again (Braiker, 2007; CBS News, 2010; Panagopolous, 2006).

These attitudes are anticipated reactions to increased perception of threat. Social scientists have long observed that insecurity and perception of threat leads to the development of authoritarian attitudes (From, 1941) and intolerance, particularly against outgroups in ways that can affect the latter's enjoyment of full rights as citizens (Sniderman, 1975; Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, & Roberts, 1985; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982). Hogg and Abrams (1993) explain that individuals often resort to discriminatory attitudes and behaviors in order to reduce social uncertainty. Circumstances that foster a perception of danger have been found to contribute to both negative attitudes towards racial, ethnic, and religious outgroups, as well as diminished support for preserving the rights of outgroups (Bobo, 1988; Brewer, 1999, 2001; Brown, 2000; Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998; Esses, Hodson, & Dovidio, 2003; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Lahav, 2004; Quillian, 1995; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006; Sherif, 1966; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Stephan & Stephan, 2000, 1996; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; Tajfel, 1981). However, in addition to reducing tolerance for outgroups, perception of threat also has been shown to lead communities to draw a shaper distinction between themselves and outgroups (Baron, Inman, Kao & Logan, 1992; Stephan & Stephan, 1985) producing greater ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Brewer (1999) refers to these interlinked processes as "outgroup hate" and "ingroup love," while Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter (2006) apply this concept to the study of Israeli attitudes during the period of increased terrorism in the 2000 intifada.

Two experimental studies demonstrate how increased threat is linked to outgroup hate and ingroup love in a way that predicts public support for subjecting Muslim terror suspects to ill treatment. The first, a study by Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen (2004), found that the 9/11 terrorist attacks increased sentiments of fear and anger in the American public and that these aroused emotions were linked with higher levels of outgroup derogation and ingroup enhancement. The researchers theorized that the attacks produced a threat to the public's sense of moral equilibrium and noted that these circumstances have been found to prompt, among other things, a craving for punitive measures to restore equilibrium (Tetlock, 2002; Tetlock, Kirstel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). This assumption is consistent with other work showing that individuals experiencing threat or fear exhibit higher levels of ethnocentrism and are more likely to support punitive responses to outgroup members (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995). The second, a study by Carlsmith and Sood (2009), begins by noting that while the use of physically punishing interrogation of terrorism suspects is conventionally justified as a tool to obtain information from suspects, a contrary literature theorizes retribution or exacting punishment from suspects is a stronger latent motivation. Through an experiment, the authors find that subjects were indeed supportive of the application of harsh interrogation of a fictional Afghan detainee suspected of terrorism for punitive reasons.

Hypotheses

Given this body of work, this study investigates whether outgroup hate and ingroup love, produced in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, have prompted the American public to proscribe different standards of treatment for Muslim and non-Muslim terrorism suspects held by authorities. The study expects that the American public is much more likely to accept treating Muslim terror suspects more harshly than "Anglo-American" or domestic right-wing suspects, because they view the former as an alien force worthy of punitive measures while identifying with the latter. The strategy of the study is to "cast a wide net" in terms of gauging public support for subjecting Muslims, as an outgroup, to more harsh treatment. It therefore surveys respondents' opinions about a range of new techniques—both interrogation and detention techniques—adopted by U.S. counterterrorism officials against terror suspects since 9/11 to detect outgroup and ingroup effects without hypothesizing technique-specific findings. The first hypothesis of the study compares respondent support for use of harsh interrogation and detention for suspects identified with Muslim (outgroup) versus Anglo (ingroup) names and suspects alleged to be members of a radical Muslim (outgroup) or domestic, right-wing (ingroup) terrorist organization. It expects respondents to be more tolerant of subjecting Muslims and members of Muslim groups to extreme treatment:

> *H1:* The U.S. adult public is more supportive of the use of harsh interrogation and detention practices against terror suspects identified as Muslims or as members of Islamic terrorist organizations than suspects identified as non-Muslims with Anglo names or as members of domestic, right-wing terrorist organizations.

The second hypothesis of the study specifically tests the ingroup-love framework. It expects respondents to be significantly less supportive of subjecting suspects to extreme interrogation and detention if they are identified as ingroup members with Anglo names and domestic group affiliations:

> *H2:* The U.S. adult public is more resistant to the use of harsh interrogation and detention practices against terror suspects identified with Anglo names or as members of domestic, right-wing terrorist organizations than otherwise unidentified suspects.

Survey Design

To test these hypotheses, I executed an online survey of individuals residing in the United States investigating their support for interrogation and detention practices that have come into use by U.S. counterterrorism officials since the 2001 terrorist attacks. The survey was funded through a Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS)/National Science Foundation grant and was fielded from December 8 to December 26, 2011 to 1,744 respondents, out of which 1,135 completed the survey for a completion rate of 65.1%. The median respondent took approximately four minutes to complete the survey, and 90% of the subjects completed the survey in 15 minutes or less. The survey was fielded nationally and included respondents from all 50 U.S. states.

The sample is broadly representative of the U.S. adult public.[1] Respondent attributes in the sample differ by an average of 4.4% per item from comparable data for the U.S. public reported by the U.S. Census and surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center and Gallup.[2] All respondents were 18 years

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[1] Descriptive statistics about the sample can be found in the appendix. (Appendix Table 1)

[2] See U.S. Census Bureau, "USA Quick Facts" retrieved February 2013 from www.quickfacts.census.gov; Gallup 2012, "2012 U.S. Electoral Looks Like 2008" retrieved February 2013 from http://www.gallup.com/poll/158399/2012-electorate-looks-like-2008.aspx; various polls reported via Pew Research Social and Demographic Trends retrieved February 2013 from http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/category/datasets/.

or older, and the median age for respondents was 49. The median respondent reported having at least some college education, though the plurality had obtained a Bachelor's degree or higher and relatively few (10.6%) did not finish high school. The majority of respondents (75.4%) were non-Hispanic Whites, and the median reported income for respondents was between $50,000 and $59,999. The sample was balanced at 51% male, and 58% of respondents identified themselves as married, not divorced. The sample was also reasonably balanced in terms of political party affiliation with around 46% reporting as Republicans and 51% reporting as Democrats.[3] Respondents overwhelmingly identified themselves as Christian (around 77%) while the survey included only 4 Muslim respondents in total.

The survey was fielded online by Knowledge Networks, a polling company that maintains a randomly contacted, nationally representative pool of respondents who agree to be available to participate in online surveys.[4] Knowledge Networks uses random-digit telephone dialing, email, and mailed questionnaires to recruit U.S. residents into their panel and facilitates and incentivizes participation in online polls by providing panelists with free WebTV computer and internet access. The panel was, furthermore, racially balanced by randomly recruiting panelists using two strata derived from the 2000 Census: one that has a higher concentration of African American and Hispanic households and another with a lower than national average concentration of these groups. While internet-based surveys have become ubiquitous, prompting concern about their validity and reliability, research by Dennis (2001) and by Malhotra and Kuo (2008) find online surveys to perform as well as random-dial phone surveys while Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz (2012) find them to perform better in terms of representative sampling than traditional, in-person convenience surveys, such as those administered to university students. Furthermore, as noted by Lacina and Lee (2012), Iyengar (2008) illustrates several advantages internet surveys—using nationally representative panels—yield vis-à-vis in-person surveys, such as reduction of potential interviewer biases and the ease and efficiency with which balanced and nationally representative sets of respondents can be assigned to experimental and control treatments.

Treatments

Prior to the experiment, the respondents were told they were invited to take an optional survey on their attitudes about an important public policy issue. Upon agreeing to participate, they were randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups or to the control group. Respondents were then required to read a short vignette operationalizing the main independent variable of the study: terror-suspect religious affiliation. The vignettes presented a fictitious Associated Press news blurb describing an FBI arrest of two terrorism suspects in suburban Chicago. For those respondents assigned to the control group, neither the names of the two suspects nor the name of the terrorist group are identified in the vignette, and no religious orientation is ascribed to the suspects or to the terrorist group involved. Two of the treatments expose respondents to vignettes in which the suspects are identified as Muslim. In one, the suspects are identified using two easily identifiable Muslim names but the terrorist movement is unidentified. In the other, the suspects are not identified by name, but the terrorist group is explicitly described as a radical Islamist group using a contrived Arabic name combining common monikers of radical Islamist terrorist groups published in the Global

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[3] Measures of respondent partisan affiliation and political ideology were collected prior to the test as part of the standard panel information. These, like other attributes such as religion and religiosity, are self-reported identification items.

[4] Upon recruitment to the panel, Knowledge Networks collects basic demographic, political, and social information about participants. Information about these individual attributes of panel participants were collected prior to their participation in any survey.

Terrorism Database (GTD).[5] Because it is possible that some respondents might be relatively tolerant of Muslim rights but view Islamist terrorist movements as inherently more dangerous, the treatments for suspect religious identity and the ideological orientation of the terrorist group are split into these two separate vignettes. The other vignettes are treatments for non-Muslim suspects and are mirror images of the Muslim treatment vignettes; however, they use stereotypical Anglo-American names for the suspects with the group unidentified in one vignette and a contrived, domestic right-wing extremist name combining common monikers of domestic terrorist movements derived from the GTD database with the suspects unidentified in the other.

The vignettes were otherwise identical in narrative, making any differences observed across groups attributable to the treatment only. They were also balanced in terms of numbers of respondents and the demographic, political affiliation and ideological attributes of respondents. The treatments contained between 212 and 240 respondents each, and summary statistics for the respondent attributes for the five vignettes indicate that their mean values do not vary by more than 1% from treatment to treatment. Furthermore, checks show the treatments to be balanced and do not reveal significant correlations between the vignettes and the demographic, political affiliation and ideological attributes or the order in which respondents were asked questions about the vignettes.[6] The vignettes are published in the appendix for the study.

Survey Questions

After being read one of the vignettes, respondents answered a series of 13 questions that operationalize the dependent variables of the study. The order of the questions administered was randomized. The first 10 questions determined respondent opinion about specific interrogation techniques that have been adopted by U.S. counterterrorism officials since 9/11—for example, applying electric shock to detainees or waterboarding detainees—using the same or similar questions summarized in the article by Gronke et al. (2010). The final three questions determine respondent opinion about specific types of detention and trial practices used against terror suspects, such as refusing detained suspects access to legal counsel or holding them indefinitely without formally accusing them of a crime. Each question is deliberately concise and offers respondents a 5-point Likert-scale menu of responses ranging from "Strongly Support" to "Strongly Oppose."[7] The specific questions about extraordinary interrogation and detention along with descriptive statistics outlining overall responses are detailed in Table 1.

On average, looking at the entire sample irrespective of treatments, only a minority of all respondents expressed support or strong support for extraordinary interrogation (33.0%) or detention (33.9%). The responses to specific types of extraordinary interrogation and detention techniques exhibit high levels of interitem correlation and Mokken scale analysis and Cronbach Alpha tests indicate that scales comprising individual measures are unidimensional.[8] Moreover, as previously noted, all questions are asked on the same 5-point scale and are measured in the same direction. Because of this, in addition to analyzing treatment effects on responses to the individual questions about interrogation and detention of suspects, I also employ an aggregated/combined scale measure

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[5] The Global Terrorism Database is maintained by the START Center, a DHS Center of Excellence, housed at the University of Maryland. The GTD data and codebook is available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

[6] Results available from author.

[7] The merits, in terms of validity and reliability, of 5-point scale responses to questions to gauge support or opposition are discussed by Krosnick (1999).

[8] Average interitem correlation for the interrogation questions is .672 and .637 for the detention questions. Mokken scaling results show that Loevinger coefficients H_j and H have values above .5 for the interrogation and detention questions (average .713*** for interrogation questions and .650*** for detention questions), which is a standard rule-of-thumb threshold for a strong scale (see Van Schuur, 2003). Similar findings are produced in Cronbach Alpha tests. The average alpha score for interrogation questions is .953 and .637 for detention questions. Full results are available from author.

Table 1. Survey Questions about Extreme Interrogation and Detention Techniques

Interrogation	Strongly Support (5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	Strongly Oppose (1)	No Answer	Mean	S.D.
Applying electric shocks to the suspect	8.3%	13.1%	23.6%	26.2%	26.4%	2.2%	3.40	1.40
Holding the suspect's head under water	8.6%	10.8%	22.5%	26.1%	28.9%	2.8%	3.44	1.45
Making the suspect go naked	8.7%	11.9%	25.9%	28.2%	22.1%	2.9%	3.31	1.41
Exposing the suspect to extreme heat or cold	10.2%	17.8%	27.0%	22.8%	19.1%	2.9%	3.11	1.42
Punching or kicking the suspect	6.8%	8.1%	25.8%	32.3%	24.3%	2.4%	3.49	1.34
Forcing the suspect to remain in a physically stressful position for long periods of time	13.5%	24.3%	26.0%	17.7%	15.8%	2.4%	2.88	1.40
Withholding food and water from the suspect	11.2%	21.1%	24.3%	23.7%	17.0%	2.5%	3.03	1.41
Bombarding the suspect with loud noise for long periods of time	13.3%	25.9%	27.3%	16.8%	14.0%	2.4%	2.82	1.37
Not allowing the suspect to sleep	17.3%	29.5%	25.0%	13.6%	12.0%	2.3%	2.64	1.36
Yelling at the suspect	24.4%	31.7%	27.2%	8.6%	5.4%	2.5%	2.28	1.22
Detention								
Not allowing the suspect to meet with a lawyer	8.8%	10.7%	25.9%	31.1%	21.0%	2.2%	3.36	1.35
Holding the suspect indefinitely without charge	7.6%	15.3%	26.6%	28.2%	19.7%	2.3%	3.27	1.35
Trying a suspect before a military commission instead of a criminal court	18.2%	25.5%	31.7%	11.4%	10.5%	2.4%	2.60	1.32

of respondent tolerance for extreme interrogation and detention and compare these across treatments in the analysis. This is operationalized simply as an additive sum score index of responses to all questions and ranges between 10 and 50 for interrogation and 3 and 15 for detention.

Analysis and Results

The hypotheses of the study are tested by comparing mean levels of support for the interrogation and detention techniques across treatment groups using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and contrast analysis tests. The results of these tests are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4a/4b. As a further check of the results, sets of ordered logit regression estimations with treatment groups as predictors of respondent support or strong support for the various techniques are also conducted. These are presented in the appendix, and their results conform to the ANOVA models. As previously noted, the study employs two dependent variables—respondent support for subjecting the suspects in the vignettes to extreme interrogation and extreme detention—which are measured both as individual and aggregated scale measures. Treatment effects are analyzed through the construction of two independent variables: whether or not the suspects are identified by a Muslim/Arabic or Anglo name and whether or not the suspects are depicted as associates of a radical Islamic or domestic, right-wing terrorist group. Differences in mean levels of support for interrogation and detention for these two pairs of treatment groups—Muslim versus Arabic name and Muslim versus domestic, right-wing group— are reported and assessed with F scores. Furthermore, one-way ANOVA difference-of-means tests with Bonferroni post hoc comparisons are also presented to detect differences between all treatments and the control group.

Overall, the tests produce partial support for the hypotheses. Respondents exposed to treatments where the hypothetical terror suspects were depicted with stereotypical Muslim or Arabic names or

Table 2. Response Scores for Interrogation and Detention of Terrorist Suspects, Comparison by Treatment Group

	Treatment							ANOVA All Groups
	Suspects Muslim[1]	Suspects Non-Muslim[2]	Contrast / F[3]	Muslim Org.[4]	Right-Wing Org.[5]	Contrast / F[6]	Control[7]	F[8]
(Scale) Extreme Interrogation	29.1	28.6	.45 / .24	27.8	28.1	-.33 / .21	28.8	.5
(Scale) Extreme Detention	**8.8**	**8.2**	.6 / 4.43*	**8.5**	**8.0**	.48 / 2.80*	8.5	2.3*
Specific Extreme Interrogation Technique:								
Yelling at suspect	3.6	3.5	.08 / .59	3.6	3.6	.02 / .03	3.6	.1
Not allowing suspect to sleep	3.3	3.2	.08 / .51	3.2	3.2	.04 / .14	3.2	.3
Bombarding suspect with loud noise	3.1	3.0	.09 / .65	3.0	3.0	.02 / .02	3.0	.2
Withholding food and water from suspect	2.9	2.8	.03 / .08	2.7	2.8	-.12 / 1.07	2.8	.6
Forcing suspect to remain in stress positions	3.0	3.0	-.03 / .07	2.9	3.0	-.14 / 1.41	3.0	.4
Punching or kicking suspect	2.3	2.3	.04 / .11	2.3	2.4	-.06 / .34	2.4	.1
Exposing suspect to extreme heat or cold	2.7	2.8	-.05 / .15	2.6	2.6	.04 / .10	2.8	1.0
Making suspect go naked	2.6	2.5	.03 / .09	2.4	2.4	.00 / .00	2.5	.5
Simulating drowning of suspect	2.4	2.4	.07 / .33	2.3	2.4	-.07 / .33	2.5	.6
Applying electric shocks to suspect	2.5	2.4	.06 / .26	2.4	2.4	-.01 / .00	2.5	.7
Specific Extreme Detention Practice:								
Trying suspect before military commission	**3.4**	**3.1**	.25 / 4.94*	3.2	3.2	.06 / .30	3.3	1.7*
Holding suspect indefinitely without charge	**2.7**	**2.6**	.16 / 2.17*	**2.7**	**2.4**	.28 / 6.17*	2.5	2.8*
Not allowing lawyer for suspect	**2.6**	**2.4**	.21 / 3.62*	2.5	2.3	.15 / 1.62	2.6	2.0*
n	240	226		232	225		212	

[1]Treatment where suspects are identified with a Muslim name.
[2]Treatment where suspects are identified with Anglo / non-Muslim name.
[3]Contrast and F score, ANOVA for mean scores of treatment groups "Suspects Muslim" and "Suspects Non-Muslim".
[4]Treatments where suspects are associated with Muslim extremist terrorist organization/movement.
[5]Treatments where suspects are associated with domestic, right-wing terrorist organization/movement.
[6]Contrast and F score, ANOVA for mean scores of treatment groups "Muslim Org." and "Right-Wing Org."
[7]Control vignette where suspects are unidentified and are not affiliated with a specified organization/movement.
[8]F score, ANOVA difference of means between treatments and control group with Bonferroni post hoc comparison tests.
Indicates treatment groups are different. *$p \leq .1$.

Table 3. Response Scores, Anglo and Domestic, Right-Wing Treatments versus Control

	Treatment / Control					
	Suspects Non-Muslim	Control	Contrast / F	Right-Wing Org	Control	Contrast / F
(Scale) Extreme Interrogation	28.6	28.8	−.17 / .03	28.1	28.8	−.67 / .44
(Scale) Extreme Detention	8.2	8.5	−.27 / .84	**8.0**	**8.5**	−.49 / 2.70*
Specific Extreme Interrogation Technique:						
Yelling at suspect	3.5	3.6	−.04 / .13	3.6	3.6	.01 / .00
Not allowing suspect to sleep	3.2	3.2	−.03 / .04	3.2	3.2	−.07 / .36
Bombarding suspect with loud noise	3.0	3.0	.00 / .00	3.0	3.0	−.01 / .01
Withholding food and water from suspect	2.8	2.8	−.00 / .00	2.8	2.8	−.02 / .03
Forcing suspect to remain in stress positions	3.0	3.0	.03 / .08	3.0	3.0	.06 / .22
Punching or kicking suspect	2.3	2.4	−.07 / .34	2.4	2.4	.01 / .02
Exposing suspect to extreme heat or cold	2.8	2.8	−.06 / .23	**2.6**	**2.8**	−.22 / 3.19*
Making suspect go naked	2.5	2.5	.01 /.01	2.4	2.5	−.099 / .59
Simulating drowning of suspect	2.4	2.5	−.12 / .88	2.4	2.5	−.12 / .89
Applying electric shocks to suspect	2.4	2.5	−.07 / .33	2.4	2.5	−.12 / 1.00
Specific Extreme Detention Practice:						
Trying suspect before military commission	**3.1**	**3.3**	−.18 / 2.25*	3.2	3.3	−.16 / 1.76
Holding suspect indefinitely without charge	2.6	2.5	.04 / .14	2.4	2.5	−.14 / 1.39
Not allowing lawyer for suspect	2.4	2.6	−.16 / 1.90	**2.3**	**2.6**	−.22 / 3.71*
n	226	212		219	212	

*$p \leq .1$.

as members of a radical Islamic terrorist organizations were not more likely to support subjecting the suspects to extreme interrogation. However, they were more supportive of extreme detention for the suspects. Similarly, respondents exposed to treatments in which the terror suspects were associated with a domestic, right-wing terrorist movement were not *less* likely to subject them to extreme interrogation ("ingroup love") but were less likely to subject them to extreme detention. This evidence is consistent with the outgroup hate theoretical framework supporting Hypothesis 1. The specifics of these results are described below.

The ANOVA and contrast analyses between treatment groups are illustrated in Table 2. The first two rows present the results of difference-of-means tests for the two aggregate, scale measures of support for extreme interrogation and detention, and they evince a pattern found throughout the results. Whereas mean support for interrogation is quite similar across all treatments—illustrated by the fact that the contrast-analysis coefficients are small, and none of the F tests reach standard levels of significance—mean support for detention is significantly higher for suspects with Muslim names and suspects that are depicted as members of Muslim terrorist groups, suggesting outgroup effects. Respondents in the study were 7.31% more likely to subject suspects with Muslim names versus Anglo names to extreme detention and were 6.25% more likely to support extreme detention for suspects alleged to be members of radical Muslim terrorist movements than right-wing domestic movements.[9]

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[9] These differences are significant but not dramatic. One possible explanation for this is social desirability bias, which means that "real" effects of suspect religious identity are likely larger than those produced in the study.

Table 4a. Response Scores for Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects, Comparison by Treatment Group and Respondent Attribute

Respondent Attribute	Treatment							ANOVA All Groups	n
	Suspects Muslim	Suspects Non-Muslim	Contrast / F	Muslim Org.	Right-Wing Org.	Contrast / F	Control	F	
≥ 45 Years Old	29.3	28.2	1.10 / .73	28.4	27.6	.85 / .43	30.3	1.35	622
College Educated	27.3	28.5	−1.06 / .66	27.0	27.6	−.54 / .17	27.3	.39	656
Household Income ≥ $50,000	28.3	29.2	−.92 / .44	**29.0**	**26.4**	2.67 / 3.50*	29.4	1.52	544
White	29.2	28.7	.57 / .24	27.1	28.5	−1.38 / 1.41	29.0	1.10	810
Conservative	32.5	31.1	1.39 / .66	29.5	31.2	−1.63 / .66	31.4	.87	413
Racist Attitudes	32.7	31.7	1.04 / .49	30.5	29.6	.83 / .31	31.2	1.35	487
Authoritarian Personality	30.0	29.2	.81 / .65	28.6	28.8	−.18 / .03	29.1	.56	967
Christian	29.8	29.1	.66 / .37	28.9	28.5	.36 / .11	29.7	.44	821
Religious	28.6	28.1	.51 / .07	26.5	27.5	−1.06 / .29	26.8	.39	286
Male	29.8	29.9	−08 / .00	29.6	28.4	1.23 / .75	29.7	.37	553
n	235	221		227	219		120		

*$p \leq .1$.

Table 4b. Response Scores for Detention of Terrorist Suspects, Comparison by Treatment Group and Respondent Attribute

Respondent Attribute	Treatment							ANOVA All Groups	n
	Suspects Muslim	Suspects Non-Muslim	Contrast / F	Muslim Org.	Right-Wing Org.	Contrast / F	Control	F	
≥ 45 Years Old	**9.0**	**8.2**	.82 / 4.86*	8.7	8.1	.57 / 2.29	8.8	2.18*	641
College Educated	8.4	7.9	.45 / 1.40	8.2	7.8	.44 / 1.34	8.2	.73	671
Household Income ≥ $50,000	8.5	8.4	.10 / .06	**8.8**	**7.5**	1.34 / 10.31**	8.3	2.9*	554
White	**9.1**	**8.3**	.8 / 5.78**	8.4	8.0	.43 / 1.60	8.7	3.06*	831
Conservative	**10.1**	**9.0**	1.07 / 5.03*	9.4	9.0	.40 / .82	9.1	1.93*	425
Racist Attitudes	**10.0**	**9.1**	.89 / 4.48*	**9.6**	**8.6**	1.02 / 5.63*	9.1	3.22*	499
Authoritarian Personality	**9.1**	**8.5**	.63 / 4.60*	**8.9**	**8.2**	.63 / 4.41*	8.6	2.57*	1000
Christian	**9.2**	**8.5**	.65 / 4.19*	**9.0**	**8.4**	.62 / 3.65*	8.8	2.13*	853
Male	8.9	8.3	.59 / 2.10	**8.8**	**7.7**	1.09 / 6.78**	8.3	2.62*	565
Religious	**8.5**	**7.6**	.98 / 3.15*	7.3	7.3	-.00 / .00	7.3	1.79	293
n	235	221		227	219		120		

*$p \leq .1$, **$p \leq .01$.

When looking at differences for specific extreme interrogation and detention techniques, corresponding patterns are found. No significant differences in mean support are found between treatment groups for the individual interrogation practices. Average support for interrogation is higher for many but not all (for example, exposure to extreme heat or cold) for the Muslim name treatment than the Anglo name treatment but do not meet standards for statistical significance in the ANOVA tests. However, significant treatment effects are found for several of the specific detention practices. Mean support for subjecting suspects with Muslim names to trial before a military commission and to indefinite detention and support for denying Muslim-named suspects access to a lawyer is significantly higher than for suspects with Anglo names. Likewise, mean support for indefinitely detaining suspects associated with radical Islamist terrorist movements is significantly higher than for right-wing, domestic terrorist affiliates.

To check for support for the ingroup-love framework—Hypothesis 2—I conduct a second set of ANOVA and contrast analyses between the treatments where terror suspects are identified in the vignettes with Anglo names and as members of a right-wing, domestic terrorist movement and the control vignette where suspects are not named or identified with a group. The expectation here is that respondents will be less likely to subject the suspects to interrogation and detention if they understand them to be Anglos or domestic terrorists versus unidentified. The results of these tests are presented in Table 3.

These results provide some evidence for ingroup-love impulses among respondents while reproducing earlier patterns. ANOVA and contrast-analysis tests are not significant for the aggregate scale measure for extreme interrogation or for any of the individual types of extreme interrogation, save exposure to extreme cold, which respondents are less likely to use against members of right-wing terrorist movements versus the control. Nor are there significant differences in support for extreme detention overall between respondents in the Anglo name treatment versus the control group, with the exception of trying suspects before a military commission, which respondents are less likely to support for Anglo-named terrorists. However, mean support for subjecting terror suspects associated with domestic, right-wing terrorist movements to extreme detention is significantly lower than support in the control. This is also the case specifically for not allowing legal representation for right-wing, domestic terrorists.

Treatment Effects and Respondent Attributes

Some interesting results are produced when the effects of respondent attributes on treatment effects are investigated. Respondents were randomly assigned to the four treatment groups and the control group in the study, and previously mentioned descriptive evidence shows that the treatments and control were balanced in terms of respondent demographic and other attributes. However, when respondent attitudes towards subjecting suspects to interrogation and detention were compared by both treatment and select respondent attributes, a pattern emerges in which racial/ethnic identity, political ideology, attitudes towards race, personality type, and, to an extent, religion, matter. The specific respondent attributes examined include those commonly investigated in social science survey research, especially surveys of opinions on tolerance of outgroups: age, education level, household-income level, ethnicity/race and gender, political ideology, religion, and level of religiosity (Davis & Silver, 2004; Huddy et al., 2005; Oswald, 2005; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006). Also included are indicators measuring authoritarian personality type and presence of racist attitudes among respondents, as these can be expected to also temper attitudes towards outgroups and ingroups (Brigham, 1993; Davis & Silver, 2004; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Huddy et al., 2005). These attributes are measured using dichotomous variables coded 1 for respondents who are 45 years old or older, that have at least some college education, that have a household income of $50,000 or more, that are White or Caucasian, that are self-described political conservatives, Christian in terms

of religion, male, and attend religious service once a week or more. Racist attitudes and authoritarian personality type are measured using standard questions modeled after questions used in surveys by Brigham (1993) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011).[10]

The effects of respondent attributes on differences in respondent support for interrogation and detention for the two independent variables of the study can be seen in Tables 4a and 4b. As is the case for all of the other difference-of-means tests, treatment effects are not evident for respondent support for extreme interrogation of suspects. In all of the tests in Table 4a, there are not significant differences in mean levels of support between treatments where the suspects are identified with Muslim versus Anglo names or as members of Islamic rather than domestic, right-wing terrorist movements. The same is true when comparing mean support between respondents exposed to the Muslim terrorist organization treatment versus the right-wing, domestic terrorist group treatment with one exception: respondents with higher household incomes seem to be significantly more likely to subject suspects in Islamic terrorist movements to extreme interrogation than they are for right-wing domestic terrorists.

However, several respondent attributes are important in conditioning treatment effects for attitudes toward extreme detention. As portrayed in Table 4b, only respondents with racist attitudes and with authoritarian personality types and respondents self-identifying as "Christian" conform to the main results in being significantly more likely to subject Muslim-named suspects and suspects associated with Islamic terrorist movements to extreme detention. White, older, conservative, and religiously observant respondents are found to be more likely to approve of detention for Muslim as opposed to Anglo-named suspects, but they are not significantly more approving of detention for suspects depicted as members of Muslim terrorist movements versus right-wing domestic movements. Conversely, wealthier and male respondents are significantly more likely to support detention for suspects associated with Islamic terrorist groups versus domestic terrorist-group members, but they are not more likely to subject Muslim-named suspects to detention. Finally, college-educated respondents exposed to the Muslim-named and Islamic group treatments were slightly more supportive of detention for suspects than college-educated respondents exposed to Anglo-named and domestic group treatments but not significantly so. Overall, significant differences in means between paired treatments in Table 4b are larger (average of .858) than those in the main results in Table 2 (average of .550), suggesting that treatments effects for Muslim versus Anglo-named suspects and Islamic terrorist group versus domestic right-wing group are stronger for older, White, wealthier, conservative, Christian, male, and religiously observant respondents.

Discussion

The study, therefore, finds some evidence that the religious identity of terrorism suspects is an important factor in the American public's approval of the use of some of the new, harsh counterterrorism techniques adopted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The religious identity of a terror suspect—measured in terms of stereotypical Muslim versus Anglo names and in terms of alleged membership in a radical Muslim versus domestic, right-wing terrorist organization—significantly affects

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[10] These include dichotomous questions, gauging whether respondents think it is more important for a child to "have respect for elders" versus "independence" and "curiosity" versus "good manners" and respondent support for the statements: "I do not think that discrimination against other groups is a problem today" and "I think that members of other groups are too demanding in their push for equal rights." These are converted to dichotomous measures coded 1 for authoritarian personality if the respondent expressed support for "respect for elders" or "good manners" and coded 1 for respondents expressing support or strong support for either of the statements about race and ethnicity. Respondents were asked these questions after being exposed to treatments and answering questions about support for interrogation and detention.

respondent support for the application of harsh detention practices against suspects, such as detention without charge, without access to an attorney, and without access to civilian courts. No significant effects were found for subjecting suspects to harsh interrogation. These findings illustrate the utility of the outgroup-hate and ingroup-love theoretical model of individual reaction to perception of threat and desire to apply punitive measures to outgroup transgressors to understanding public opinion regarding a highly salient contemporary policy issue in the United States: detention of terror suspects. This same theoretical model might apply to other War on Terror policy issues such as the use of drones for security, NSA surveillance, or the creation of new counterterrorism laws or granting of new counterterror powers to law enforcement. Future studies could test whether or not public support for these is contingent on the religious identity of the targeted population.

As previously stated, the purpose of surveying respondent support for both harsh interrogation and detention practices was to use the fullest possible complement of post-9/11 counterterrorism practices against terror suspects in measuring the public's attitudes. The a priori theoretical expectation was that the American public was more permissive of harsh treatment in general of Muslim-identified suspects. The hypotheses of the study, supported by existing theoretical work, are not clearly specified in terms of specific counterterrorism practices. However, there are a couple of possible explanations for the different findings for interrogation and detention in this study and some ideas that future research could investigate.

First, the interrogation activities portrayed in the survey, such as waterboarding, have received significantly more media attention than have the more abstract and legalistic practices depicted in the detention questions. The subject of physical abuse of people detained for terrorism charges—brought to public attention through public debate over abuse scandals at Guantanamo Bay, Baghram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq—also was hotly debated in national politics, prompting public condemnation by national figures such as U.S. Senator John McCain, a Congressional legislative action to ban various torture practices in 2005 through the Detainee Treatment Act, and a veto of this act by President Bush. (Jansen, 2008). In contrast, there has been little contentious public debate about extraordinary detention of detainees. The result has been that the American public has access to a clearly articulated criticism of extraordinary interrogation and vivid images of the outcome of such interrogation practices on actual Muslims but little information at all about extraordinary detention. This asymmetry might condition respondent attitudes, making them discount the negative impact of detention on Muslim suspects and therefore more tolerant of such practices. Future research might directly test this by interacting measures of respondent familiarity with or exposure to news stories about interrogation versus detention practices with support for subjecting Muslim suspects to these practices.

Second, most of the activities depicted in the 10 questions about interrogation of terror suspects have since 2009 been made illegal via President Obama's Executive Order requiring interrogation and treatment of terror suspects, held both abroad and within the United States, to conform to the U.S. Army Field Manual on Interrogations (White House, 2009). In contrast, the detention practices depicted in the survey remain legal, having been interpreted as legally valid by both the Bush and Obama Justice Departments (White House, 2001). This may also condition respondent attitudes, as respondents might regard application of extraordinary interrogation, regardless of suspect identity, to be a legally questionable tactic while extraordinary detention, particularly against suspects depicted as "foreign," is not freighted with such concerns. These are only speculations. Future research may survey respondents about their level of awareness of post-9/11 interrogation and detention techniques in order to determine why the public has different levels of toleration for these two practices.

As a final discussion point, it should be noted that although the results provide evidence that both the personal religious identity and the group affiliation of the suspects are significant predictors of respondent tolerance of extreme detention, the Muslim name treatment is more frequently significant

in the tests of respondent support for specific types of detention. This is a finding that could be further explored in future studies. If it were to be consistently reproduced, it might suggest that individual religious identity itself primes tolerance for harsh treatment, which would be more consistent with the identity-based theories that motivate the article.

Conclusion

The finding that the American public is more tolerant of subjecting individuals suspected of terrorist activity to extreme detection if the suspects are Muslim or are claimed to be members of a Muslim extremist group—if valid—has several public policy implications, potentially identifying a loophole in popular democratic constraint of executive branch counterterrorism behavior. Counterterrorism officials may recognize that currently the public is generally hesitant about authorizing enhanced interrogation and detention techniques in the War on Terror but may bank on greater public leniency in dealing with some types of terror suspects. This opens the possibility of a nuanced and gradual erosion of standards for civil liberties and human rights standards in the United States, with less risk of the type of public backlash that a general, nondiscriminatory policy of terror suspect abuse might provoke.

Furthermore, the divergent findings in the study between interrogation and detention practices might suggest to human rights and civil liberties organizations concerned with rising Islamophobia in the United States that efforts to monitor and reform counterterrorism detention, as opposed to the often more highlighted interrogation practices like waterboarding, should receive high priority.

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Appendix

Terrorist Suspect Religious Identity and Public Support for Extraordinary Interrogation and Detention Practices

Survey Instrument: Vignettes. Respondents are randomly assigned to read one of five vignettes, which precede the survey questions, creating balanced vignette groups. These vignettes are used to operationalize the independent variable of the study: suspect religious identification.

Vignette 1 [Control: Terror Suspects Unidentified, Group Unidentified]
July 10, 2011
Associated Press. CHICAGO, Illinois—"FBI detains two terror suspects in raids"

FBI agents conducted raids Thursday on two homes in the Chicago area used by members of a group that federal agents describe as a "violent extremist movement" intending to "levy war against the United States." Two suspects were detained in the raids. According to FBI spokesman Alan Meyers, members of the group were planning terrorist attacks against government buildings and conspired to murder law enforcement officials and civilians. Agents found explosive materials, firearms and an undisclosed amount of cash in one of the houses during the raid. The group has also previously threatened to attack popular tourist sites, like Disney World, on its website. FBI agents confirmed that other suspected group members were still at large. Meyers declined to comment further on the case.

Vignette 2 [Muslim Treatment: Terror Suspects Identified as Muslim, Group Unidentified]
July 10, 2011
Associated Press. CHICAGO, Illinois—"FBI detains two terror suspects in raids"

FBI agents conducted raids Thursday on two homes in the Chicago area used by members of a group that federal agents describe as a "violent extremist movement" intending to "levy war against the United States." Two suspects were detained in the raids and are identified as Muhammad Ibrahim, 26 and Hussein Faisal, 21. According to FBI spokesman Alan Meyers, members of the group were planning terrorist attacks against government buildings and conspired to murder law enforcement officials and civilians. Agents found explosive materials, firearms and an undisclosed amount of cash in one of the houses during the raid. The group has also previously threatened to attack popular tourist sites, like Disney World, on its website. FBI agents confirmed that other suspected group members were still at large. Meyers declined to comment further on the case.

Vignette 3 [Muslim Treatment: Terror Suspects Unidentified, Group Identified as Radical Muslim]
July 10, 2011
Associated Press. CHICAGO, Illinois—"FBI detains two terror suspects in raids"

FBI agents conducted raids Thursday on two homes in the Chicago area used by members of a group that federal agents describe as a "violent extremist movement" intending to "levy war against the United States." Two suspects were detained in the raids. According to FBI spokesman Alan Meyers, members of the Islamic extremist group *Da'wa al Jihad* were planning terrorist attacks against government buildings and conspired to murder law enforcement officials and civilians.

Agents found explosive materials, firearms and an undisclosed amount of cash in one of the houses during the raid. The group has also previously threatened to attack popular tourist sites, like Disney World, on its website. FBI agents confirmed that other suspected group members were still at large. Meyers declined to comment further on the case.

Vignette 4 [Non-Muslim Treatment: Terror Suspects Identified as non-Muslim, Group Unidentified]

July 10, 2011

Associated Press. CHICAGO, Illinois—"FBI detains two terror suspects in raids"

FBI agents conducted raids Thursday on two homes in the Chicago area used by members of a group that federal agents describe as a "violent extremist movement" intending to "levy war against the United States." Two suspects were detained in the raids and are identified as Thomas Rand, 26 and James Rockwell, 21. According to FBI spokesman Alan Meyers, members of the group were planning terrorist attacks against government buildings and conspired to murder law enforcement officials and civilians. Agents found explosive materials, firearms and an undisclosed amount of cash in one of the houses during the raid. The group has also previously threatened to attack popular tourist sites, like Disney World, on its website. FBI agents confirmed that other suspected group members were still at large. Meyers declined to comment further on the case.

Vignette 5 [Non-Muslim Treatment: Terror Suspects Unidentified, Group Identified as Right-Wing Extremist]

July 10, 2011

Associated Press. CHICAGO, Illinois—"FBI detains two terror suspects in raids"

FBI agents conducted raids Thursday on two homes in the Chicago area used by members of a group that federal agents describe as a "violent extremist movement" intending to "levy war against the United States." Two suspects were detained in the raids. According to FBI spokesman Alan Meyers, members of the right-wing extremist group *National Resistance Militia* were planning terrorist attacks against government buildings and conspired to murder law enforcement officials and civilians. Agents found explosive materials, firearms and an undisclosed amount of cash in one of the houses during the raid. The group has also previously threatened to attack popular tourist sites, like Disney World, on its website. FBI agents confirmed that other suspected group members were still at large. Meyers declined to comment further on the case.

Survey Instrument: Survey Questions. After reading one of the above vignettes, respondents are asked to read and respond to the following survey questions. These questions operationalize the independent variable of the study—support for controversial interrogation and counterterrorism detention practices—and controls for authoritarian personality type and level of tolerance for

[*Note*: Questions 1 through 10 taken from Gronke et al. 2010]

"Could you please tell me if you would support or oppose each of these items as a method of getting information from a suspect in the case described above."

Strongly Support	Support	Neither Oppose Nor Support	Oppose	Strongly Oppose
1	2	3	4	5

1. Applying electric shocks to the suspect.
2. Holding the suspect's head under water.
3. Making the suspect go naked.
4. Exposing the suspect to extreme heat or cold.
5. Punching or kicking the suspect.
6. Forcing the suspect to remain in a physically stressful position for long periods of time.
7. Withholding food and water from the suspect.
8. Bombarding the suspect with loud noise for long periods of time.
9. Not allowing the suspect to sleep.
10. Yelling at the suspect.

"Could you please tell me if you would support or oppose each of these situations for a suspect in the case described above."

Strongly Support	Support	Neither Oppose Nor Support	Oppose	Strongly Oppose
1	2	3	4	5

11. Not allowing the suspect to meet with a lawyer in their defense.
12. Holding the suspect indefinitely without accusing them of a crime.
13. Trying the suspect before a military commission instead of a criminal court.

[*Note*: Questions 14 and 15 taken from Brigham (1993) and measure prejudicial attitudes]
"Now could you please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements."

Strongly Support	Support	Neither Oppose Nor Support	Oppose	Strongly Oppose
1	2	3	4	5

14. I do not think that discrimination against other groups is a problem today.
15. I think that members of other groups are too demanding in their push for equal rights.

[Note: Questions 16 and 17 taken from Hetherington et al. (2011) and measure authoritarianism]
"Now I would like to know more about your attitudes towards raising children."

16. Do you think it is more important for a child to have:

Respect for Elders	Independence
1	2

17. Do you think it is more important for a child to have:

Curiosity	Good Manners
1	2

Appendix Table 1. Respondent Descriptive Statistics

Respondent Attribute	
Male	51.4%[1]
Ethnicity	
White, non-Hispanic	75.4%[2]
Black	7.8%
Hispanic	9.7%
Multi-ethnic and other	2.7%
Age	
Median Age	49[3]
18–29	17.2%
30–44	24.4%
45–59	29.8%
60+	28.4%
Annual Household Income	
Median Income	$50,000–$59,999[4]
Under $50,000	40.7%
Over $50,0000	59.1%
Education	
High School or less	39.3%[5]
Some College or more	60.6%
Currently Employed	56.3%
Own their Home	78.3%
Political Ideology	
Republican ("strong" or "lean")	45.6%
Democrat ("strong" or "lean")	51.2%
Religion	
Christian, Protestant	40.3%[6]
Christian, Catholic	22.5%
Christian, Nondenominational/Other	11.2%
Jewish	3.0%
Muslim	0.4%
Other	6.8%
Non-religious	15.8%
Attend Religious Service Weekly or more	39.1%
Married	58.1%[7]
Child/Children at home	32.4%

Comparison with national population:

[1]Estimated male population in U.S. is 49.03% (CIA World Fact Book, 2010)

[2]U.S. Non-Hispanic White population is estimated at 72.4% (U.S. Census, 2010)

[3]U.S. median age is 36.8 yrs. (CIA World Factbook, 2010)

[4]U.S. median income reported to be $46,326 (U.S. Census, 2010)

[5]Estimated % of U.S. population with a bachelor's degree or more is 30.9%, with a high school degree and some college is 56.7% and less than high school is 12.4% (U.S. Census, 2010)

[6]Estimated portion of U.S. population identified as "Christian" is 76.0% (U.S. Census, 2010)

[7]Comparable figures for U.S. national population are collected at the household, not individual, basis. 48.4% of U.S. households contained a (non-same sex) married couple. (U.S. Census, 2010)

Regression Analyses

As a check, a battery of tests is conducted on the data using ordered logistical regression estimations. The purpose of the regression analyses is to confirm the findings of the ANOVA tests and to further highlight the direction of the relationship between treatment and respondent attitudes towards extreme interrogation and detention. The regression models also help to detect the effects of "out-group hate," which should produce a positive relationship between treatments identifying suspects as Muslim or belonging to a Muslim terrorist movements, and "in-group love," which should produce a negative relationship between treatments identifying suspects with Anglo names or belonging to domestic, right-wing terrorist organizations.

Because the dependent variables in these tests are ordinal scale measures of respondent support for subjecting the terrorism suspects in the vignettes to extreme interrogation and detention methods,

an ordered logit estimation strategy is appropriate. (Long & Freese, 2006) Again, because attitudes towards the individual types of interrogation and detention surveyed in the study exhibit strong inter-correlation and Mokken and Alpha tests reveal them to adhere to a uni-dimensional scale, it is more efficient to analyze treatment effects on aggregated or combined measures of support for interrogation and detention. However, as a check, I also conducted duplicate models for respondent support of each individual type of interrogation and detention by treatment and found that they produce corresponding results: none of the treatments are significant predictors of respondent support for any specific interrogation technique but respondents assigned to treatments where suspects were identified with stereotypical Muslim names were more likely to support all three detention practices, and respondents assigned to treatments where the suspects were identified as members of a right-wing domestic terrorist group were less likely to subject them to indefinite detention or to not permit them to have a lawyer.

The independent variables in the models are nominal dummy variables for the treatment groups and the control group. In the models, I evaluate one at a time each treatment as a predictor of the scaled extreme interrogation measure, keeping the control group as the reference category. This allows me to compare treatment affects versus the control, where no identity or group affiliation of the suspects is mentioned. I also estimate models where two treatments are included—treatments where subjects are identified with Muslim names and are members of Muslim terrorist groups versus treatments where suspects are identified with Anglo names or as members of domestic, right wing groups—and the other two are reference categories. This allows me to test the relationship of the Muslim name treatment against the Anglo name treatment and the Muslim group treatment against the domestic, right-wing group treatment.

The results of these ordered logit regression estimations are summarized in Appendix Table 2, predictors of attitudes towards extreme interrogation, and Table 3, predictors of attitudes towards extreme detention.

Appendix Table 2. Regression Results, Treatment Effects on Respondent Attitudes Towards Extreme Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects

(Y) Scale, Extreme Interrogation						
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
(X) Treatments:						
Suspects Muslim[1]	.099				.101	
	(.132)				(.145)	
Muslim Org.[3]		−.113			−.068	
		(.132)			(.144)	
Suspects Non-Muslim[2]			.046			.042
			(.133)			(.146)
Domestic, Right-Wing Org.[4]				−.098		−.073
				(.131)		(.143)
Control[5]					.078	.062
					(.146)	(.146)
n	1,067	1,067	1,067	1,067	1,067	1,067
Likelihood ratio χ²	.57	.12	.73	.57	1.33	.77
Log Likelihood	−3724.84	−3425.06	−3724.75	−3724.84	−3724.46	−3724.73
Pseudo r²	.0001	.0000	.0001	.0001	.0002	.0001
Reference Category	Control	Control	Control	Control	Susp. Non-Muslim Right-Wing Org.	Susp. Muslim Muslim Org.

Two-tailed tests, standard errors in parentheses
*p ≤ .1 **p ≤ .01
Note. Coefficients and standard errors for cut-points are not reported to save space.
[1]Treatment where suspects are identified with a Muslim name.
[2]Treatment where suspects are identified with Anglo / non-Muslim name.
[3]Treatments where suspects are associated with Muslim extremist terrorist organization/movement.
[4]Treatments where suspects are associated with domestic, right-wing terrorist organization/movement.
[5]Control vignette where suspects are unidentified and are not affiliated with a specified organization/movement.

Appendix Table 3. Regression Results, Treatment Effects on Respondent Attitudes Towards Extreme Detention of Terrorist Suspects

(Y) Scale, Extreme Detention						
	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]	[12]
(X) Treatments:						
Suspects Muslim[1]	.299*				.406**	
	(.129)				(.142)	
Muslim Org.[3]		.031			.194	
		(.131)			(.144)	
Suspects Non-Muslim[2]			−.100			−.214
			(.130)			(.143)
Domestic, Right-Wing Org.[4]				−.321*		−.391**
				(.131)		(.144)
Control[5]					.236	−.065
					(.145)	(.145)
n	1,101	1,101	1,101	1,101	1,101	1,101
Likelihood ratio χ^2	5.33*	.06	.6	5.94**	8.71*	8.19*
Log Likelihood	−2628.19	−2630.82	−2630.55	−2627.88	−2626.50	−2626.76
Pseudo r^2	.001	.0000	.0001	.001	.0017	.0016
Reference Category	Control	Control	Control	Control	Susp. Non-Muslim Right-Wing Org.	Susp. Muslim Muslim Org.

Two-tailed tests, standard errors in parentheses
*p ≤ .1 **p ≤ .01
Note. Coefficients and standard errors for cut-points are not reported to save space.
[1]Treatment where suspects are identified with a Muslim name.
[2]Treatment where suspects are identified with Anglo / non-Muslim name.
[3]Treatments where suspects are associated with Muslim extremist terrorist organization/movement.
[4]Treatments where suspects are associated with domestic, right-wing terrorist organization/movement.
[5]Control vignette where suspects are unidentified and are not affiliated with a specified organization/movement.

The results of Appendix Table 2 mirror those produced in the ANOVA tests. None of the treatments, in any combination, are significant predictors of respondent attitudes towards extreme interrogation of the suspects in the vignettes. Significant results are found, however, in Appendix Table 3. Compared to the control group, respondents exposed to the treatment where suspects were identified with common Arabic/Muslim names were significantly more likely to support extreme detention. The odds-ratio calculation for the treatment in model 1 demonstrates that respondents reading vignettes in which the suspects had Muslim names were 34.8% more likely to register "support" or "strong support" for extreme detention than to be neutral or to oppose such treatment.[11] Also, compared to the control group, respondents exposed to the treatment where suspects were revealed to be members of a domestic terrorist movement were significantly less likely to support extreme detention; specifically, 27.5% less likely to support or strongly support versus expressing neutrality or opposition.[12] Corresponding results are found in models 11 and 12. In these models, respondents are show to be significantly more likely to subject suspects with Muslim versus Anglo names to detention (34.0% more supportive)[13] but significantly less likely to do the same for suspects depicted as members of right-wing terrorist groups (28.5% less supportive).[14]

[11] Odds Ratio = 1.348* (se = .175)
[12] Odds Ratio = .725* (se = .095)
[13] Odds ratio = 1.34* (se = .180)
[14] Odds ratio = .715* (se = .097)

Finally, Appendix Table 4 presents summarized results—just the coefficients and the standard errors—for the respondent support for specific types of extreme interrogation and detention.

Appendix Table 4. Summary of Ordered Logistical Regression Results, Treatment Effects on Respondent Attitudes Toward Specific Extreme Interrogation and Detention Practices.

	Treatment			
	Suspects Muslim	Suspects Non-Muslim	Muslim Org.	Right-Wing Org
Specific Extreme Interrogation Technique:				
Yelling at suspect	.041	−.106	.054	.006
	(.131)	(.136)	(.133)	(.136)
Not allowing suspect to sleep	.135	.008	−.029	−.121
	(.132)	(.134)	(.132)	(.133)
Bombarding suspect with loud noise	.117	−.026	−.005	−.046
	(.131)	(.132)	(.134)	(.134)
Withholding food and water from suspect	.093	.058	−.214	.006
	(.133)	(.131)	(.133)	(.132)
Forcing suspect to remain in stress positions	−.001	.070	−.131	.086
	(.132)	(.132)	(.133)	(.132)
Punching or kicking suspect	−.032	−.065	−.049	.075
	(.132)	(.134)	(.134)	(.136)
Exposing suspect to extreme heat or cold	.004	.116	−.124	−.186
	(.133)	(133)	(.133)	(.132)
Making suspect go naked	.095	.064	−.112	−.102
	(.133)	(.131)	(.133)	(.134)
Simulating drowning of suspect	.060	−.035	−.148	−.033
	(.132)	(.135)	(.133)	(.134)
Applying electric shocks to suspect	.082	−.018	−.106	−.100
	(.131)	(.133)	(.133)	(.134)
Specific Extreme Detention Practice:				
Trying suspect before military commission	.275*	−.193	−.052	−.162
	(.131)	(.135)	(.133)	(.135)
Holding suspect indefinitely without charge	.262*	.002	.171	−.372**
	(.132)	(.133)	(.133)	(.134)
Not allowing lawyer for suspect	.228*	−.123	.016	−.318*
	(.132)	(.132)	(.133)	(.136)

Two-tailed tests, standard errors in parentheses
Coefficients and standards reported only.
Reference Category in all Models is Control (suspects are unidentified and are not affiliated with a specified organization/movement.)
*p ≤ .1 **p ≤ .01

Again, consistent results are produced. Regardless of treatment, respondents were not significantly likely to subject the suspects to any type of extraordinary interrogation. However, respondents assigned to treatments identifying suspects with Muslim names were significantly more likely to support trying the suspect before a military commission, holding the suspect indefinitely and not allowing a lawyer to represent the suspect. Conversely, respondents in treatments where the suspects are identified as right-wing, domestic terrorists were significantly less likely to support indefinite detention for them or to deny them access to a lawyer. These results further suggest out-group hate and in-group love processes.